Quick Divorce.jpgAccording to a recent report by the AARP, while the overall divorce rate in the U.S. has declined, divorce among those between the ages of 50 and 64 has spiked. What was once an oddity has now become commonplace.

“Historically we thought, ‘Older people, they don’t get divorced,'” said Susan L. Brown, co-director of the National Center for Family & Marriage Research at Bowling Green University in Ohio. “Now one in four people getting divorced is over the age of 50. In 1990, it was less than one in 10.” Such a huge change has intrigued researchers who are seeking to find out what led to the shift.

The divorce rate for those 50 to 64 increased from 6.9 divorces per 1,000 marriages in 1990 to 12.6 in 2009. At the same time, the overall divorce rate dropped from 18.95 to 17.92.

Researchers have said that the increase in divorce rates among older couples is because of the life transition that takes place upon retirement. Retired couples often face difficulties adjusting to life without children in the house and a busy career to keep them occupied. Retirement especially hits marriages hard as spouses who once defined themselves by what they did now are forced to find new meaning in their lives. Meanwhile, spouses used to being alone most of the day must adjust to having somebody else around.

If one or both of the spouses experienced divorce in the past, they are more at risk for a future divorce later in life, Brown said. The numbers speak for themselves; the divorce rate for aging baby boomers is twice as high for those who were previously divorced than those who were on their first marriage.

Unique issues arise for late in life divorcees. For those looking to remarry in their golden years, the pool of potential mates increases for men because the ratio of women to men increases with age. For women, however, it becomes harder to find a husband. Divorces late in life can also be financially devastating, with the woman typically qualifying for half the man’s retirement savings. Remarriage also raises concerns over estates and inheritances among the couple’s children from previous marriages.

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According to a recent advice column on FoxBusiness.com, post-divorce debt is one crucial issue often ignored by parties in the aftermath of a divorce. Many mistakenly believe that everything has been resolved by the divorce decree. However, some unfortunate divorcees have discovered that things are not always so simple.

According to former bankruptcy judge and current attorney R. Glen Ayers, “Most divorce decrees allocate liabilities for pre-divorce obligations between the former spouses. So, the husband agrees or is ordered to pay certain credit card obligations and similar debts. The wife may agree or be ordered to pay a car note or some other debts. While the divorce decree may allocate responsibility between the spouses, that decree does not release either spouse from the obligation to the creditor.”

The fact is that even if a settlement agreement lays out who is to pay what debt, it does not mean that the other party is legally released from the formerly joint obligation. If the spouse responsible for making the payments falls behind, then the other spouse remains liable to the creditors, regardless of what the divorce decree says.

The Federal Trade Commission’s website contains advice for anyone considering divorce, saying to pay special attention to the status of your credit accounts. If you maintain any joint accounts with your ex-spouse, it’s critical that you continue making regular payments so that your credit score won’t suffer. As long as there’s a balance on a joint account, you both remain legally responsible for it.

If you do decide to divorce, a skilled North Carolina family law attorney would suggest that you close joint accounts or accounts where your former spouse is listed as an authorized user. You might also consider approaching the creditor directly and ask that they convert the account to an individual account.

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According to a recent article in the Beaufort Observer, the North Carolina Court of Appeals this week handed down a somewhat surprising decision concerning Islamic Sharia Law. The Court of Appeals decided to grant an annulment to a man on the grounds of bigamy. The husband argued that his marriage of 12 years (and resulting in three children) was null and void because the wife was previously been married according to Sharia Law and that earlier marriage was never properly dissolved.

The North Carolina Court held that the wife’s first marriage was legal despite there being no marriage certificate and it not being performed by an imam or other licensed minister. Because no legal process to void the first marriage was ever undertaken, the Islamic wedding ceremony was upheld as an official legal marriage. Because the first marriage was deemed legal, the wife was already married when she met her second husband and that second marriage thus became null and void.

The decision was a split 2-1 decision which means it is appealable to the North Carolina Supreme Court. The woman in question is looking for assistance finding an attorney because she cannot afford to appeal at the moment.

The recent decision is both interesting and important. The decision upheld Sharia Law by legitimizing an Islamic marriage ceremony that was nothing more than one man pronouncing two individuals husband and wife. No marriage license was involved, no official minister. Yet the actions were condoned by the North Carolina Court of Appeals when they upheld the validity of the first marriage by granting an annulment for the second.

The wife in the case argued that she was divorced when she entered into her second marriage because she had complied with Islamic law for dissolving a marriage. Bizarrely, the Court of Appeals rejected this argument (the exact one they accepted from the husband). On one hand, the Court decided to enforce a religiously-based marriage that did not meet the legal requirements of marriage, while on the other hand the Court refused to accept the religiously-based divorce, instead requiring a civil termination.

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children 5.jpgAccording to a recent report, the parents who gave their three children Nazi monikers have had their children taken away from them by the Department of Youth and Family Services. There appears to be a significant dispute about the basis for having the minor children taken from their parents. These three children each have Nazi style names. In fact, the family gained national attention when they went to the grocery store to get a birthday cake for their son, Adolf Hitler. The clerk at the cake counter apparently would not put the child’s name on the cake and reported the situation to authorities.

The interesting issue here, aside from the unique names of the children, is why were the children taking from their parents in the first place? While most of us would not choose to name our son “Adolf Hilter,” surely, no one wants to live in a society where the government can swoop in and take children away because it does not approve of the names of the children, do they? What if the government were to begin publishing a list of names which are forbidden? Or worse, what if it began publishing a list of acceptable child names?

There appears to be a significant disconnect here with respect to why the children were taken away from their parents. According to one source noted in the article, the children were taken away from their parents because there was evidence of domestic violence in the household. Candidly, this seems rather farfetched to this writer. Even if there were an incident of domestic violence, would that justify the government taking these children away from their parents? Indeed, one might wonder if there are enough foster homes in Mecklenburg County to house all of the children whose parents may have had an incident (isolated or otherwise) of domestic violence. The “domestic violence” angle seems to be a rather weak red herring.

What seems more likely is exactly what the Court of Appeals seems to have found: that there is no legitimate reason why the children were taken away from their parents. Or, more precisely, that the children were taken away from their parents because somebody did not like how these parents chose to name their children. What about these parents’ constitutional right to parent their children? What about these parents’ constitutional right to free speech?

Of course, as we all know, very little is black and white and there probably is no easy answer to this question. As much as it might seem Un-American to take someone’s son away from them for naming him “Adolf Hitler” (how ironic!), there does seem to be a counter argument. Might it be argued by the government that the act of naming a child “Adolf Hitler” is, in and of itself, a form of child abuse? Indeed, one might imagine that this child will suffer years of otherwise unlikely attention and, maybe, ridicule, scorn and taunting. What if little Adolf were to be a big time basketball player? What would the fans chant while he is on the free throw line? We all know how heartless and unthinking children and adolescents can be at times.

While this may be an extreme case, the notion of the government taking children away because they are not given “acceptable” names seems to be a very slippery slope. Who decides if a name is acceptable? By what standards is it determined whether a name is acceptable or not acceptable? Is the government to publish a list of acceptable and unacceptable names? Is a parent to get prior approval before putting a name on the birth certificate?

As a parent, moms and dads have a tremendous amount of responsibility for the wellbeing and development of their child. Decisions which moms and dads make every day have a huge impact on the upbringing and advancement of their children. Such decisions affect whether the child will be a good student, whether they will respect authority and the law, whether they will have a good work ethic. Even decisions as seemingly innocuous as how to have the child’s hair styled or what the child is to eat for dinner are within the parents’ discretion and can have an impact on the child.

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You have probably seen the “BIG D” divorce lawyer commercials on The Golf Channel or maybe on ESPN. They seem to run on channels that men would generally watch and they tug at the heartstrings of men going through, or potentially going through, a legal separation or divorce. The “BIG D” is omnipresent in the lives of the men portrayed in the commercial while a gentleman with a soft southern accent does a moving voiceover. The commercial makes reference to a dad’s perspective in child custody matters as well as illustrating how divorce can affect his financial position (apparently alluding to post separation support, alimony, child support or equitable distribution matters).

Alas, a “nationwide domestic law firm” from St. Louis, Missouri has set up shop in North Carolina. This law firm markets itself as a divorce law firm for men.

One question, obviously, is whether the “Divorce Lawyers for Dads” focus is an advantage or whether it is just a slick marketing campaign. One may also wonder if it is a good thing to hire a “nationwide domestic law firm” or whether it is better to have a lawyer who is local, with deep roots in the community. Obviously, you need to make these determinations for yourself. But, Fox News Charlotte has done this report:

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Adoption.jpgIn the adoption and child custody case of Best v. Gallup, the North Carolina Court of Appeals examined a case involving both an adoption and nonparent child custody. In the adoption and child custody case at bar, mother and “father” were romantically involved and intended to be married. For approximately six (6) years, mother and “father” had custody of, and raised together, the minor child. Prior to marriage, mother adopted the minor child while “father” was in Iraq working. The intention of the parties was for “father” to adopt the minor child after the “father” returned from a job in Iraq and the parties were married. Before “father” returned from Iraq, before the parties were married and before the “father” could formally adopt the minor child, mother broke off the relationship with “father.” “Father” filed a civil lawsuit for child custody against mother.

The trial court dismissed “father’s” action for child custody. The trial court found that it would not be in the best interest of the minor child for said minor child to be cut off from “father” but that mother had not acted contrary to her paramount parental status. The trial court did not actually specify the exact reason for the dismissal of “father’s” child custody action. “Father” appealed and mother did not file any brief in opposition.

The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s dismissal and remanded the case back to the trial court for the establishment of a child custody and visitation schedule. The North Carolina Court of Appeals, based on the actual findings of fact by the trial court, reversed the trial court’s determination that mother had not acted contrary to her constitutionally protected status as parent. Rather, the North Carolina Court of Appeals found that mother had, in fact, acted contrary to her constitutionally protected status as parent. The North Carolina Court of Appeals found as such based on two particular points. First, it found it compelling that mother had allowed “father” to make decisions relating to the minor child. Second, the North Carolina Court of Appeals noted that mother had brought another person (“father”) into the household for an indefinite period of time with no expectation of that relationship ending. Ultimately, the North Carolina Court of Appeals ruled that “father” was entitled to child custody and/or visitation because mother had acted contrary to her constitutionally protected status as parent and it would be in the minor child’s best interest for “father” to have parenting time.

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Grandparents 2.jpgIn the case of Powers v. Wagner, the North Carolina Court of Appeals considered a case where the trial court awarded primary custody of a minor child to the child’s grandparents. As with any grandparent visitation or grandparent custody case, the analysis is very fact specific and it is important to consider all of the relevant facts when considering such a case. Here, the mother and father had a child out of wedlock while they both lived in Florida. Mother and father did not marry. Mother eventually filed an action against father in Florida for paternity and child support. The paternity action determined that father was the biological father of the minor child. Mother also received an order for child support against Father. Importantly, no child custody determination was made in Florida.

Father took the minor child to North Carolina and the minor child lived with the paternal grandparents in North Carolina for an extended period of time. The paternal grandparents were granted temporary child custody of the minor child in September 2009. The paternal grandparents were granted permanent legal and physical custody of the minor child, with a structured visitation schedule for mother, in November 2009. Mother appealed and challenged two issues with respect to this family court opinion. First, mother contended that the trial court erred in finding that it had subject matter jurisdiction. Second, mother contended that the trial court failed to make adequate findings of fact supporting its conclusion that mother had acted contrary to her constitutionally protected parental rights.

While the trial court’s order did not explicitly track the language of North Carolina General Statute § 50A-102(7), the North Carolina Court of Appeals found that the trial court did make adequate findings of fact to support its conclusion that North Carolina had subject matter jurisdiction over this grandparent custody case. The North Carolina Court of Appeals noted that it is a better practice to for the family trial court to specifically outline its findings of fact pertaining to the “home state” of the minor child, it is not necessary.

The North Carolina Court of Appeals agreed with mother that the trial court did not make adequate findings of fact to support its conclusion that mother had acted contrary to her constitutionally protected parental rights. The North Carolina Court of Appeals considered the recent decisions in Bozeman (discussed herein at North Carolina Supreme Court Considering Same-Sex Adoption, Same Sex Adoption without Same Sex Marriage? and Same Sex – Second Parent Adoption Case Decided by North Carolina Supreme Court) and Price to illustrate the importance of the trial court analyzing the intent of the parent who is alleged to have acted inconsistently with their constitutionally protected parental rights. Specifically, the trial court is required to consider the parent’s intention with respect to the relationship between the minor child and the third-party (in this case the paternal grandparents) when the relationship begins and as it develops.

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Charlotte Child Custody Law Firm.jpgA case out of the Mecklenburg County Family Court (Charlotte, North Carolina) denominated Maxwell v. Maxwell was recently considered by the North Carolina Court of Appeals. After being held in contempt, ordered to undergo a psychiatric evaluation and having his visitation suspended, Father entered notice of appeal. He appealed the Mecklenburg County Family Court’s order on three grounds: First, he contended that the court erred in holding him in civil contempt of court for failing to pay child support. Second, he contended that the Court erred in ordering him to undergo a psychiatric evaluation. Finally, he contended the court erred in suspending his visitation. At issue in this case was whether the Mecklenburg County Family Court’s order amounted to a temporary order on child custody or whether it was a permanent order on child custody. We will only consider the second two issues in this post.

After taking evidence, which included evidence of physical and verbal abuse by the Father, the Charlotte family court judge ordered, ex mero moto (on its own motion), that the Father must go through a psychiatric evaluation before he may have visitation with the minor children (who happen to be quadruplets). In essence, the father contended that the Court erred in requiring him to undergo a psychiatric evaluation without proper notice of the hearing and an opportunity to be heard. The North Carolina Court of Appeals disagreed noting that the Court has broad discretion in the determination of the best interests of minor children. Consistent with this broad discretion, the trial Court has the authority to order, on its own motion, that a party undergo a psychiatric evaluation.

The last issue raised by appellant was whether the Court made adequate findings of fact to support its suspension of father’s visitation with the minor children. Interestingly, there was some issue here with respect to whether the Mecklenburg County Family Court Judge intended to enter a temporary child custody order or whether it intended to enter a permanent child custody order. The issue raised by Father was that the Court did not find that either (1) the Father was unfit to have visitation with the minor children; or (2) that it was in the minor children’s best interest that Father not have visitation with them. Indeed, these are the requirements set forth in North Carolina Gen. Stat. § 50-13.5(i).

As mentioned previously, at issue is whether this was a temporary child custody order or a permanent child custody order. The reason being that a temporary order would ordinarily not be immediately appealable whereas a permanent order would be immediately appealable. The North Carolina Court of Appeals treated the order at issue as permanent, and therefore immediately appealable, despite the fact that it was silent with respect to whether it was a temporary child custody order or a permanent child custody order. Importantly, the North Carolina Court of Appeals noted that the order at issue in the case at bar was silent with respect to a review date.

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children 3.jpgIn the case of Hibshman v. Hibshman the North Carolina Court of Appeals entered a ruling relating to a modification of child custody case. In this case, the parties had a prior child custody order (by consent) which awarded primary child custody to mother. Said consent order on child custody provided that said award of primary child custody was contingent upon Mother remaining with the minor children in a particular school district. The consent order on child custody provided that if motion moved away from the particular school district then the Court would receive additional evidence and would be free to modify the prior child custody decree without making a finding of a substantial change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the minor children. Interestingly, not only did the prior consent order on child custody provide for this stipulation, but the parties and child custody lawyers reconfirmed this stipulation at trial.

Ultimately, the mother moved and the Court held an evidentiary hearing in order to determine what would be in the best interests of the minor children. Again, the parties reconfirmed their stipulation that the Court did not need to take evidence on, or find facts supporting, a substantial change in circumstances to support any modification of child custody. The Court took the evidence and changed primary custody from mother to father. Not surprisingly, mother appealed and, among other things, argued that the parties could not waive the necessity of the Court finding that there had been a substantial change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the minor children.

The Court held that there is no provision in North Carolina child custody law which would permit the parties to waive the necessity of the Court finding that there had been a substantial change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the minor children. The Court noted that North Carolina General Statutes § 50-13.7 (Modification of order for child support or custody) governs modification of child custody and explicitly requires the finding of a change of circumstances before child custody may be changed. The Court noted that this requirement of a substantial change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the minor children is intended to bring about a level of stability in child custody litigation cases.

The Court considered father’s contention that mother had waived her right to object on these grounds and should be equitably estopped from being able to appeal on this issue. The Court noted that the requirement of a showing of a substantial change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the minor children is a statutorily mandated limit on the Court’s authority to modify child custody. According to the North Carolina Court of Appeals, it is not a personal right which may be waived by either of the parties. The Court also noted that the requirement of a showing and a finding of a substantial change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the minor children is a requirement which is intended to protect the minor children. It is not a requirement which is intended to protect either of the parents.

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divorce 3.jpg An article recently on Yahoo.com entitled “Ten Costly Sports Divorces” seems to have been spurred by the recent announcement that NBA basketball player Kris Humphries and Kim Kardashian were divorcing after only 72 days of marriage. According to this article, the Humpries-Kardashian wedding cost $10 million. Kardashian filed for divorce citing irreconcilable differences. The couple had a prenuptial agreement in place, so the marriage and quick divorce should not create any complicated financial issues to resolve.

The point of the article is to illustrate how much these various sports figures would have benefited from a prenuptial agreement. Here are the examples that are cited:

Jeff Gordon and Brooke Sealey: The full details of the deal were not disclosed publicly , but according to a report by the Associated Press, Sealey was guaranteed $15.3 million from the sale of two homes. One might guess that she received significantly more than this in alimony and other property distribution.

Michael Jordan and Juanita Vanoy: Juanita Vanoy was awarded $168 million in the divorce settlement.

Greg Norman and Laura Andrassy: This settlement was for $105 million to Mrs. Andrassy.

Lance Armstrong and Kristin Richard: According to a book about Lance Armstrong entitled “Lance Armstrong’s War,” the settlement was for $14 million to Ms. Richard.

Tiger Woods and Elin Nordegren: After the highly publicized car accident and allegations of Woods being unfaithful, Nordegren filed for divorce. The full details of the deal were not disclosed but according to “a source close to Nordegren,” she received $100 million.

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